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Lo que las cárceles no logran borrar
Por: Colectiva Abolicionista MalRebaño y KjaXonora
Hay que decirlo, la entrevista con Basil Farraj y Hashem Abushama nos dejó consternadas, y tal vez rabiosas, como dijo el poeta Benedetti. Farraj enseña en la Universidad de Birzeit, en Cisjordania, y estudia el encarcelamiento y las relaciones del Estado israelí con América Latina. Abushama es escritor y profesor de geografía humana en la Universidad de Oxford, e investiga el anticolonialismo, el marxismo y las formas de la solidaridad global. Los dos llegaron a la conversación después de una semana de espacios de discusión en Colombia durante el mes de septiembre, y hablaron desde su experiencia y desde lo que muchas comunidades han pensado y sistematizado durante décadas.
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From Taxi Drivers to Cannon Fodder
By Santiago Martínez and Andrés Gómez, Translated by: Clark Gudas
Ramiro* was driving to the bus terminal in Bogotá when, in the middle of a conversation, he mentioned that he wanted to go fight for Ukraine against Russia because he needed more money. Ramiro, a taxi driver, candidly confessed to his passengers that he wanted to participate in the international conflict. This kind of comment is not unheard of, and money was not his only motivation. While Ramiro spoke enthusiastically about the chance to make money, he also said, without shame, that if an acquaintance cheated him in a business deal, he would “settle the score” and then go off to war.
Beyond these motivations, whether to get rich or escape justice, there are always families that suffer for those who become mercenaries.
It seems selfish of them. Because the suffering, the anguish that we go through… not knowing if they’re okay, if they’re not, if something happened, there are no answers.
This is how Blanca Gómez describes what she feels about the disappearance of her spouse, Edgar Alonso Gómez, a man in his forties who was recruited by Russia in early 2026 while working in Poland in 2025.
Recruitment is no small matter, and there is no way to prevent it.
The radio program La Vaina, in episode 249, aired a program titled “The Colombians trapped in the Russian-Ukrainian War.” In it, Gladys Gaviria, mother of Jeiner Sánchez, a 21-year-old boy who died fighting under the Russian flag, said that nobody is stopping the recruitment, despite the death sentence it amounts to for many:
No one says anything. Because, look, when Jeiner fell, eight left our neighborhood Santo Domingo. Eight of them left, and all eight of them fell… from Aurora, from San Javier, they also went. Yeah, the working-class neighborhoods in Medellín, many left from our side, and we don’t know how many more there are.
Colombian soldiers, leveraging their years of training and combat in internal armed conflicts, with no other skills after retirement or discharge, don’t understand that when they become mercenaries, they turn into hitmen, accomplices to crimes against humanity, or cannon fodder in conflicts in Europe, Africa, and Latin America.
Colombian Mercenaries Around the World

Ilustration – Jalver Uyabán In May 2026, then-president Gustavo Petro explained that, according to government estimates, there were 7,000 Colombian mercenaries abroad. Reports supported by organizations like the UN warn that the figure far exceeds 10,000 fighters.
What transnational agencies sell to these men as a simple job opportunity hides a dynamic where countries, or companies, exploit the economic vulnerability of Colombian ex-combatants, then order them to commit acts as extreme as assassinations, like that of President Jovenel Moïse in Haiti.
On July 7, 2021, 22 Colombians took part in the assassination of Jovenel Moïse and, besides money and jewelry, also took documents. According to investigations by the outlet El País, the Haitian president was about to hand over a “list of powerful politicians and businesspeople involved in drug trafficking.”
It it troubling that Abelardo De la Espriella has spoken out in favor of hitmen:
I have instructed the Ministers of Defense and Justice to provide legal assistance to the soldiers detained in the United States for their alleged participation in the assassination of the President of Haiti, as well as financial support to their families. The just must not pay for the sinners. I want to know exactly what happened and that each individual’s responsibility is clarified. I am not the kind of president to abandon his heroes when they face hardship. I won’t leave them alone: they will have our full backing to mount their defense and for this whole situation to be clarified.
By promising help and calling the mercenaries implicated in the assassination of Jovenel Moïse “heroes,” De la Espriella helps legitimize mercenarism from the presidency, downplays the assassination of the Haitian president, and normalizes violence committed by thousands of Colombians in foreign conflicts. And that violence is not insignificant.
Reports from Human Rights Watch have denounced companies from the United Arab Emirates for recruiting Colombians to join the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Journalistic investigations reveal that in Colombia, the company A4SI promises between 2,600 to 3,400 dollars to join the organization.
According to Mona Rishmawi, member of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, “The RSF acted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Zaghawa and Fur communities in El Fasher. These are typical elements of genocide.” This means that Colombian mercenaries who have been active in the carrying out of those objectives may be complicit in those crimes against humanity, in particular:
The extermination and persecution on ethnic, gender, and political grounds, as well as war crimes, including assassination, torture, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, violations of personal dignity, starvation, and attacks against civilian populations, against the wounded and sick, against those hors de combat, as well as against protected property.
Perhaps that is why Antonio*, a Colombian mercenary who was active in Sudan, did not want to continue participating in this investigation. Off the record, however, he made clear that he did not want to fight for Ukraine because of just how bloody the war is. Apparently, Antonio understood that the probability of surviving that conflict is low, and that the chances of one’s body disappearing are very high.
Colombians Missing in the Russia-Ukraine War

Batallón Bolivar Patch Jeiner Andrés Sánchez Gavíria, 21, traveled to Russia on May 10. He contacted his family only a few times after that, and nothing more was heard from him after June 21, when his brother called to inform them that Jeiner Sánchez had been “taken out” of combat, and that his body had been burned by an enemy drone.
Edgar Gómez’s situation is similar. He communicated for the final time on October 7 to say he had reported to the Russian army, mentioning that he belonged to “Unit 2, Battalion No. 3.” He has not called since.
He sent me photos in his uniform and a photo of his dog tag. It’s all I have, says Blanca.
Columbia’s Foreign Ministry, responding to a right of petition sent by this outlet regarding Colombians missing in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, responded:
The Consular Section of the Colombian Embassy in Poland has a record of 384 cases of Colombian citizens reported as missing in action in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, broken down as follows: 2022, no cases; 2023: 4 cases; 2024, 93 cases; 2025: 268 cases.
In the same response, the Foreign Ministry reported that the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense has reported “39 Colombian citizens” who, bound by contract to the Ministry of Defense, are “missing.” It also claims that it has received requests for assistance from relatives of nearly 100 Colombian citizens who were serving in the country’s army.
On September 9, 2026, the Foreign Ministry said it had received 863 requests for consular assistance from Ukraine and 890 from Russia. All of the relatives say they have lost contact with their loved ones, and the requests for assistance focus on the repatriation of remains, locating people declared missing in combat, and locating missing people whose families have no official confirmation.
Rules That Do Not Stop Mercenarism or Its Dangers

Ilustration – Jalver Uyabán In Colombia, under Law 11 of 1992, a mercenary is considered someone who has been recruited, locally or abroad, to fight in an armed conflict, who is motivated by personal gain, and who has been promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation considerably higher than that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and function in the armed forces of their country of origin.
But it was not until 2026 that the crimes of mercenarism were codified under the government of former president Gustavo Petro. In an attempt to stem this deadly exodus, the issuance of Law 2569 of March 17, 2026 marks a turning point in the legal system, by approving the United Nations “International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.”
This legislation is a direct response to the crisis, because it establishes the crime of mercenarism, which now carries a prison sentence of 10-15 years, and also penalizes illicit recruitment with sentences of eight to twelve years.
With this instrument, the State finally establishes criminal procedural mechanisms that allow it to investigate those who finance or train these regular fighters. It also facilitates extradition by considering mercenarism as an offense covered by the international treaties in force, which strengthens the State’s jurisdiction to pursue those involved abroad.
Enforcement of the law, however, is hampered by a rigid evidentiary standard. For a person to be classified as a mercenary under criminal law, it must be proven that they were motivated exclusively by personal gain, or a considerably higher compensation.
This has created grey areas that allow the actors of privatized violence to evade justice by claiming they were providing advisory work. And, although the law presents a crucial step forward in treating recruiters and mercenaries as criminals, it does not resolve the problem. While Colombia continues to lack opportunities after military retirement, and worse, opportunities for former members of guerilla and paramilitary organizations, the promise of material reward will keep pushing thousands of Colombians to sidestep these legal barriers. This does not only represent a danger for the mercenaries and their families, but also to national and regional security.
In recent months, there has been an increase in reports related to the possible recruitment of criminal organizations in Mexico and Colombia. This situation has raised concerns that individuals with combat experience are receiving training in the use of drones and other military technologies. The hypothesis suggests that this lethal knowledge could be used to strengthen the capabilities of these organizations in Latin America, in struggles with the Public Security Force, civilians, for territorial control, dominance of strategic corridors and drug-trafficking routes.
The State’s response in terms of prevention, apparently, does not exist. El Turbión sent a petition to the Ministry of Defense asking about the prevention of recruitment of former members of the Public Security Force as mercenaries. The ministry merely acknowledged it received the message, and forwarded the matter several times: first to the Directorate of International Relations, then to the Directorate of Veterans and Rehabilitation, which in turn declared itself incapable of serving in this capacity, and forwarded the matter to the Directorate of Human Rights and International Human Law. None of the directorates responded to any of the questions.
There was no success either with the Attorney General’s Office, which affirmed that it has no “registerable information” about investigations into mercenarism or recruitment networks. When asked about the assassination of the Haitian president Jovenel Moïse, it forwarded the message to another office that never responded, and it flatly rejected to investigate what happened in Sudan, invoking the principle of territoriality, even though Colombian law allows for universal jurisdiction for genocide and crimes against humanity.
The Disappearance of Mercenaries Hits Their Families

Ilustration – Jalver Uyabán Both the scarce material and social conditions for former combatants to build a life far from weaponry, and the lack of legal clarity, end up creating conditions in which thousands of people venture to work as hired killers in Mexican cartels, or Haiti, or participate in genocides in Sudan, or serve as cannon fodder for drones over Donetsk and Kharkiv. And although many are aware of the possibility of death, they don’t imagine that their bodies will probably disappear too, nor do they imagine the pain they cause their families.
When Jeiner Andrés Sánchez Gavíria decided to fight for Russia, he did not expect to be lied to about the money he would receive, much less about the repatriation of his body. His sister says he signed his contract right away for Russia:
In Bogotá, they gave them everything. They gave them clothing, changed their phones, they gave them everything, and the trip was excellent because everything was going well.. When they arrived there, they made them sign a contract in which… well, there’s nothing that… nothing we can ask for in terms of the repatriation of the body, or the money they promised him either. And there, the contract has a clause that says that it’s for one to five years, and they told him it was just one year…
According to Maritza, her brother Jeiner also didn’t think that the living conditions would be so difficult:
He told me in the first few days that he was okay. Then, after about 15 days, he told me it wasn’t so easy anymore. The drones. They had to fight against drones. They had to see dead bodies that had been thrown out in the open field, that they were kept, in, like, a prison, that they were mistreated, that they weren’t given food, that they were left enduring hunger and thirst.
Jeiner Andrés Sánchez Gavíria told his sister Maritza that he didn’t think he would come out alive:
June 9th was the last time that we spoke and the message was that they were going to put him on the front line, that I should pray for him… He told me that he knew he wasn’t going to leave alive.
His mother, Gladys Gómez, describes how, in the wake of his disappearance, all that she has left is the pain:
It’s anguish… I mean, if you’d had him, if you’d buried him, you’d say: ‘I buried him.’ But this way, it’s nothing, it’s more anguish, more pain.
The Russian Embassy only increases the uncertainty for the family of Edgar Alonso Gómez:
They told us in person that the person we were asking about did not appear among the dead, or the missing, or the wounded.
The disappearance is not an issue only for mercenaries recruited by Russia.
In Ukraine, Colombian bodies are disappeared by their own recruiters. Recently released testimonies of Ukrainian soldiers describe how they dispose of corpses of Colombian mercenaries using acid and fire. Former president Gustavo Petro had already warned of this degradation when he signed Law 2569 on March 17, 2026, denouncing how Colombian mercenaries are treated as an “inferior race” and used strictly as “cannon fodder.”
The gravity of the matter is intensified by journalistic investigations into intercepted emails about an alleged massacre of Colombians on the Ukrainian front, which brings to the forefront the macabre dilemma of whether we are witnessing crude war propaganda or the deliberate, silent extermination of mercenaries.
In the face of overwhelming numbers of the dead and missing, the institutional response has taken the form of different kinds of consular assistance.
Regarding Russian recruitment, the Foreign Ministry has put on its website the “Procedure for consular assistance in cases of Colombian citizens who have signed contracts for the provision of military services with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.” For Ukraine, El Turbión could only find an informative bulletin from 2024 that begins:
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wishes to reiterate that the Government of Colombia does not promote nor facilitate the enlistment of Colombian citizens in the Ukrainian army. These kinds of personal decisions are entirely voluntary and individual.
In the case of Russia, while the Foreign Ministry’s procedure meets the need of families to take immediate action by submitting requests, emails, genetic samples, and documents, the reality is that it does not offer a material or concrete way to respond to their tragedies. In practice, its work is reduced to receiving formal communications and channeling diplomatic notes that remain entirely at the timing and goodwill of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense.
The Irony of Carrying On in Wars
Ramiro left us at the bus terminal, trusting that, given his age of 46, the Ukrainian army would keep him in the rear. He barely listened to the reports that warned him of the danger, and that his job would possibly be to kill other Colombians. As I left the taxi, I could not stop thinking that it was very ironic that Ramiro deliberately ignored that he would kill other Colombians that were fighting for Russia, and how sad it would be that he knew nothing of the conflict he would participate in.
It is also worrying that the Colombians’ lack of information about the conflicts they take part in leads fellow citizens to participate in genocides in Sudan or in assassinations, like those in Haiti. It is equally alarming that cartels, dissident groups, and paramilitary organizations are increasing their military capacity with mercenaries who survive Donetsk and Luhansk.
Colombian mercenarism, without a doubt, ends up being useful for committing acts against international humanitarian law with absolute impunity. Until the precarious economic and pension conditions of the active reserve are addressed, and those of the thousands of former combatants have promised not to return to arms, and until it is accepted that every exported former combatant is a liability for global security, Colombia will continue to establish itself as a supplier of disposable criminal forces in contemporary wars.

In recognition of El Turbión’s commitment to integrity and excellence in journalism, the outlet has obtained the Certification of the Journalism Trust Initiative, promoted by Reporters Without Borders under the international standard CEN CWA 17493:2019.
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De taxistas a carne de cañón
Por: Santiago Martínez y Andrés Gómez
Ramiro* conducía hacia el terminal de transporte en Bogotá, y en medio de la conversación comentaba que quería irse a combatir por Ucrania contra Rusia por que necesitaba más dinero. Ramiro, conductor de taxi, de forma cándida confesaba a sus pasajeros que quería participar en un conflicto internacional. No es raro, y no solo lo motiva el dinero. Si bien Ramiro se entusiasmaba contando de la posibilidad de lucrarse, sin pudor también aseguraba que, si un conocido le quedaba mal con un negocio, lo “arreglaría”, y que luego se iría a la guerra.
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Derrotando la doctrina donroe: América Latina puede resistir la extorsión de los cañones de Trump
Por: Nancy Okail y Michel Paalberg
La violencia performativa, es decir, ejecuciones sin juicio en el mar, oscurece la manera en que la administración está construyendo una nueva política de Estados Unidos hacia el hemisferio: actos de asesinato como herramienta para crear estructuras permanentes de dominación y extracción.
«El dominio estadounidense en el Hemisferio Occidental nunca volverá a cuestionarse», declaró el Departamento de Estado en un nuevo video que vincula, de manera algo improbable, la Doctrina Monroe de 1823 con el asesinato de personas en embarcaciones en el Caribe y el Pacífico, 200 años después.
Hacer estallar lanchas rápidas supuestamente para detener el contrabando de fentanilo, que cabe señalar, no llega a Estados Unidos en lanchas rápidas, parece carente de sentido. Como estrategia antinarcóticos es ineficaz, una valoración compartida por la DEA.
Plasmada en la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional (NSS) de diciembre de 2025, la «Doctrina Donroe» busca restaurar la preeminencia estadounidense en una región que ha sido eclipsada por China, convertir reclamos de seguridad en autoridad militar excepcional contra los «narcoterroristas», institucionalizar esa autoridad mediante órdenes permanentes, «reclutar y ampliar» gobiernos alineados con Washington, y usarla para asegurar acceso estratégico y comercial. El fin deseado: cooperación militar, acuerdos comerciales, acceso a minerales críticos y tierras raras, probablemente acompañado de turbios tratos personales para la familia Trump. El retroceso democrático, en una región donde la democracia es aún relativamente joven, es una condición necesaria para su éxito.
La arquitectura de la Doctrina Donroe sigue en construcción. Los gobiernos latinoamericanos aún pueden resistir las presiones de Washington y negarse a co-crear su orden transaccional. Una mayor integración regional re-equilibraría ese poder de negociación, ayudando a los países con menos poder a imponer condiciones, defender límites constitucionales, rechazar operaciones particulares y soportar los costos de la presión estadounidense. Más de 100 legisladores, líderes políticos y expertos de 15 países se reúnen este fin de semana en el Tercer Congreso Panamericano en Montevideo para fortalecer la colaboración regional, la base de una arquitectura alternativa a una basada en el dominio estadounidense.
La resistencia a la coerción estadounidense, sin embargo, también depende de la reparación democrática dentro de la región. Los gobiernos capturados por líderes autoritarios no pueden proveer una base duradera para la soberanía. La corrupción erosiona la capacidad estatal y la confianza pública, haciendo más atractivas las soluciones militares extranjeras. La administración Trump apuesta por una doctrina hemisférica que favorece a líderes autoritarios, ávidos de participar en la corrupción.
La prueba de concepto más visible de la Doctrina Donroe comenzó con ataques aéreos contra embarcaciones frente a la costa de Venezuela, pasó por el asesinato de pescadores en el Pacífico, luego revelado como un programa encubierto de la CIA, y llegó al anuncio, en agosto, de una nueva Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta para el Hemisferio Occidental, que establece un cuartel general permanente para convertir esos asesinatos extrajudiciales en operaciones conjuntas con gobiernos aliados. Esto se corresponde con el Escudo de las Américas de la administración, una coalición de gobiernos latinoamericanos de derecha aliados con la administración Trump. Desde el secuestro del presidente de Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, hasta los asesinatos por ataques a embarcaciones, todo se apoyó en dos guerras infinitas como marco y justificación que precedieron por mucho tiempo a Trump: la Guerra contra las Drogas y la Guerra contra el Terror.
Convertir a supuestos contrabandistas, muchos de ellos probablemente pescadores, en «narcoterroristas» es una forma de trasladar el tráfico del marco del derecho penal a las autoridades reclamadas en tiempo de guerra. Los sospechosos dejan de ser objeto de investigación para convertirse en blanco de ejecución inmediata, con evaluaciones secretas reemplazando el debido proceso y las pruebas en los tribunales. La urgencia de la seguridad nacional antepone la discrecionalidad del ejecutivo a la autoridad judicial. Los ataques a embarcaciones declaran públicamente la autoridad excepcional del ejecutivo. Los programas del Pentágono y la CIA la institucionalizan.
Como la Guerra contra el Terror, este encuadre retrata a un enemigo y crea una industria para gestionarlo. Crea sociedades de intercambio de favores con otros gobiernos que aprovechan la cooperación militar para obtener acceso a la asistencia extranjera estadounidense, armas, inteligencia y cobertura diplomática para fines poco decorosos, ya sea la represión interna, la corrupción o el asesinato estatal de su propia gente. Con las encuestas mostrando una confianza decreciente en todas las instituciones excepto en los militares, atizar el miedo a narcoterroristas todopoderosos sirve a los intereses mutuos de los reaccionarios en Washington, Bogotá y Tegucigalpa. El principal riesgo es que crea estructuras burocráticas que sobreviven a las administraciones de turno. Con la cooperación multilateral y las instituciones en declive, este nuevo complejo militar-industrial lo vuelve casi irreversible.
También crea herramientas para inmiscuirse en la política partidista interna. El éxito del «Escudo de las Américas» de Trump depende del giro continuo de América Latina hacia la derecha. Ecuador y Colombia ya aceptaron ataques militares «conjuntos» en su territorio, que probablemente se convertirán en ataques unilaterales estadounidenses. Trump intervino abiertamente en apoyo a la elección de Nasry Asfura en Honduras, como hace actualmente con Flávio Bolsonaro en Brasil. Que muchos de estos aliados estén ellos mismos vinculados al narcotráfico tiene poca importancia: el presidente de Colombia, de la Espriella, hizo carrera como abogado defensor de grandes narcos; al negocio frutero de la familia del presidente ecuatoriano Noboa se le halló transportando cocaína; y el expresidente de Honduras Juan Orlando Hernández obtuvo un indulto de Trump tras su condena en Estados Unidos por cargos de narcotráfico.
El proyecto funciona con mayor facilidad donde los cimientos democráticos son débiles y los líderes enfrentan menos restricciones por parte de los ciudadanos, los congresos, los tribunales y las instituciones independientes, lo cual refleja el propio esfuerzo de Trump por debilitar los frenos a la autoridad del ejecutivo dentro de Estados Unidos. Bukele en El Salvador ofrece el caso estelar del uso del espectro del crimen para consolidar un «estado de excepción» permanente y el autoritarismo. Tales regímenes pueden autorizar operaciones, compartir inteligencia, firmar acuerdos, asignar tierras y suprimir a la oposición con menos escrutinio.
El escrutinio democrático puede exponer los costos climáticos de la extracción, disputar las asignaciones de tierras y las intervenciones territoriales, exigir transparencia en los contratos e insistir en que la riqueza de los recursos beneficie al público. La corrupción evita esos controles al conectar al poder externo con porteros locales capaces de transferir recursos públicos y proteger el convenio. La falta de transparencia en torno a los más de 13.000 millones de dólares recaudados por Estados Unidos por la venta de petróleo venezolano ilustra la magnitud del problema de rendición de cuentas.
Para la región, el sistema emergente depende de que los gobiernos elijan participar y de que las instituciones sostengan su autoridad. Como progresistas en Estados Unidos, debemos desafiar las falsas afirmaciones antinarcóticos, el uso de fuerza letal sin control y el desperdicio de recursos públicos que sostienen este proyecto, y exigirle cuentas a nuestro gobierno. La resistencia regional y la reparación democrática deben avanzar juntas.
En reconocimiento al compromiso del equipo de El Turbión con la integridad y la excelencia en el periodismo, el medio ha obtenido la Certificación de la Iniciativa de Periodismo Confiable, promovida por Reporteros sin Fronteras con la norma internacional CEN CWA 17493:2019.

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Mientras De la Espriella lava cara al sionismo, el pueblo colombiano salva vidas
Colombia enfrenta un terremoto con graves consecuencias para las comunidades históricamente más pobres del occidente del país. Mientras miles de voluntarios, rescatistas y entidades de atención de emergencias luchan por salvar a quienes siguen atrapados entre los escombros tras más de 8 días luego del sismo, la respuesta de De la Espriella deja dudas sobre sus intereses y capacidades.
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